6.1 In Search of a Better Theory

Marcos Antonio de Lima Filho, PhD.

In this chapter, I critique the dominant paradigm of disruptive innovation, underscoring its limitations, inaccurate predictions, and definitional issues, while also proposing ways to enhance the theory. I examined Christensen’s framework-based predictions in relation to smartphones and commercial aviation. Data gathered from these industries offered a comparative foundation for contrasting diverse perspectives on disruption. In my view, the forerunners of disruption had greater explanatory power than Christensen’s concept of disruption as a resource allocation problem. To address the increasing fragmentation within the field, researchers studying disruption should prioritise the development of a unified conceptual platform by reconciling competing terminologies and approaches to achieve greater theoretical parsimony (Hopp et al., 2018). This work supports such a call. Drawing upon an analogy with evolutionary theory, I put forth a concept of disruptive innovation that aligns with earlier studies, all of which were grounded in a punctuated model of industrial evolution.

Issues with Disruption Theory (Section 6.2) delves into the primary academic debates surrounding disruptive innovation. It critiques Christensen’s paradigm of disruptive innovation, which has held a dominant position since the early 2000s. The section draws on the work of Thomas Kuhn to argue that every paradigm has its own limitations, and that the risk of knowledge loss increases when a paradigm begins to dominate over competing paradigms. Unfortunately, citation patterns (Figure 6.2.2) indicate that this seems to be the current situation. I also highlight the lack of simplicity and parsimony in Christensen’s definition of disruption.

The smartphone industry is covered in sections 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5. The Rise of The iPhone (Section 6.3) explores Apple’s entrance into the smartphone industry. This successful case is contrasted with Christensen’s prediction that Apple would not succeed with the iPhone. The Emergence of a Smartphone Dominant Design (Section 6.4) explains how Apple was positioned to disrupt the market by introducing a new product architecture that ultimately became an industry standard. Market Disruptions in The Smartphone Industry (Section 6.5) discusses the displacement of established operating systems due to the rise of Android, and how new entrants such as Xiaomi disrupted established players by offering high-quality products at lower prices.

Section 6.6 examines the Jet Age disruption and its impact on the airline industry. Numerous scholars have acknowledged the disruptive nature of the Jet Age, considering the jet engine as a radical departure from the piston engine. Christensen initially followed this research tradition but later redefined the concept of disruptive innovation in his own terms. This redefinition created a narrower understanding of disruptive innovation, which failed to account for revolutionary transitions like the Jet Age, the iPhone, and the rise of Android.

Contrasting Christensen’s model, Disruptive Innovation by William Abernathy (Section 6.7) presents a multidimensional perspective that resists the reductionist binary classification into sustaining and disruptive innovation. This model could better explain cases like the iPhone and the Jet Age, which pose challenges to the current disruption paradigm. Therefore, it may be beneficial for academia and industry to revisit Abernathy’s conceptualisation of disruption, potentially using it as a foundation for a new paradigm of disruption.

Sections 6.8 to 6.11 discuss how the evolution of commercial aviation defies Christensen’s disruption paradigm. To prove the predictive power of his theory, Christensen projected that regional jet manufacturers could disrupt the Boeing and Airbus duopoly, yet this never materialised. Contrary to his prediction, Boeing and Airbus maintained their market dominance, with Bombardier and Embraer sales declining since 2004. Rather than becoming a disruptor, Bombardier withdrew from the market due to weak sales and was eventually bought by Airbus.

Considering the inaccuracies of The Predictive Model of Disruptive Innovation (Section 6.9), one might challenge Christensen’s (2016) assertion that “the theory of disruption continues to yield predictions that are quite accurate, in an astounding range of industries”. This section examines the magnitude of such inaccuracies by comparing Christensen’s theory-based predictions against the stock performance of Apple, Bombardier, Embraer, Boeing, and Airbus. Contrary to his pessimistic predictions about the iPhone, Apple’s stock value has surged by over 5,500%. Similarly, Boeing and Airbus stock prices have risen above 800% and 600%, respectively, while the stock values of potential disruptors, Embraer and Bombardier, have declined by up to 80% since 2004. In light of these failures, how can the defenders of disruption theory persist in their claims that disruption theory is capable of predicting stock performance?

Sections 6.10 and 6.11 reconsider the rise of Boeing and Airbus through the prism of early disruption theories. Christensen’s narrowed view of disruption, focused on low-cost and low-performance innovations, seems insufficient to capture the full impact of the Jet Age, which he categorised as a “sustaining innovation”. Like the iPhone, Boeing and Airbus stand as high-end market entrants that triggered creative destruction in the aviation industry. While Christensen’s disruption paradigm falls short in explaining these events, earlier disruption theories provide more compelling explanations. The frameworks proposed by Abernathy, Utterback, and Henderson emphasise the role of architectural innovations and dominant designs in the evolution of industries.

Finally, How to Design Disruption (Section 6.12) wraps up the discussion presented in this chapter by proposing a new definition and explanation for disruptive innovation. In a nutshell, I argue that disruptive innovation should be characterised as the introduction of new qualities, such as a new material, component, feature, or form factor. This conceptualisation aligns with evolutionary theory and Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction. Moreover, because early disruption research was grounded in a punctuated model of industrial evolution, this redefinition can help disruption research reconcile with its earlier schools of thought.